Ambivalence researchers often collapse separate measures of positivity and negativity into a single numerical index of ambivalence and refer to it as objective, operative, or potential ambivalence. The authors argue that this univariate approach to ambivalence models undermines the validity of subsequent statistical analyses because it confounds the effects of the index and its components. To remedy this situation, they demonstrate how the assumptions underlying the indices derived from the conflicting reactions model and similarity-intensity model can be tested using a multivariate approach to ambivalence models. On the basis of computer simulations and reanalyses of published moderator effects, the authors show that the frequently reported moderating influence of ambivalence on attitude effects may be a statistical artifact resulting from unmodeled correlations of positivity and negativity with attitude and the dependent variable. On the basis of extensive power analyses, they conclude that it may be extremely difficult to detect moderator effects of ambivalence in observational data. Therefore, they encourage ambivalence researchers to take an experimental approach to study design and a multivariate approach to data analysis.
In their milder forms, pathologies often feel familiar. Such is the case with the feeling of ambivalence. When Swiss psychiatrist Eugen Bleuler (1911) introduced the concept to psychology, it was primarily meant to capture pathological forms of loving and hating the same object, such as can be observed among people with schizophrenia. Yet Bleuler already pointed out the ubiquity of ambivalence in the everyday life of normal people, foreshadowing the current surge of ambivalence research in many areas of psychology. For instance, the concept of ambivalence is used to explain why citizens do not vote for the presidential candidates they said they would (Lavine, 2001) , why restrained eaters have difficulties with weight control (Stroebe, Mensink, Aarts, Schut, & Kruglanski, 2008) , or why interactions between majority and minority group members are more intense than interactions within groups (Katz, Glass, & Wackenhut, 1986) . Across diverse behavioral domains, ambivalence is often used as a moderator variable to predict "more of the people more of the time" (Bem & Funder, 1978, p. 485) .
Although people often see both favorable and unfavorable aspects in a person, thing, or idea, they may not always be aware of this ambivalence or willing to express it (cf. Jonas, Brömer, & Diehl, 2000; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977) . At the very least, as Bleuler (1911) already observed, nonschizophrenic people tend to tally an object's favorable and unfavorable aspects and ascertain the balance. Thus, when social psychologists adopted the concept for nonclinical applications, they had to find a way of measuring ambivalence other than just asking people how ambivalent they feel about something. In fact, social psychologists began to collect data in such a way that would allow them to do the tallying themselves. For instance, the new data collection procedures required people to list the salient positive and negative attributes of an object (Scott, 1969) or to rate separately the extent of their positivity and negativity with regard to an object using split semantic differentials (Kaplan, 1972) .
No sooner had the new data collection procedures been introduced than researchers began formulating moderator hypotheses about ambivalence (Moore, 1973) . Most contemporary research regards ambivalence as a moderator variable that is assumed to modify the effects of other variables in terms of direction or size (e.g., decrease the effect of attitudes on behavior). Despite the notorious difficulties of detecting moderator effects in field studies (cf. Chaplin, 1991; McClelland & Judd, 1993) , such effects are regularly reported in the ambivalence literature and are considered "well-documented" (Crano & Prislin, 2006, p. 356) .
In the present article, we argue that researchers' familiarity with ambivalence can be deceiving. Unfortunately, much of what we know about ambivalence derives from research collapsing separate measures of positivity and negativity into a single variable intended to index ambivalence. Various mathematical formulae have been proposed to accomplish this task.
1 Each formula rests on a model of the nature of ambivalence that contains several testable assumptions about the effects of positivity and negativity (for an overview, see Breckler, 1994; Jonas et al., 2000; Priester & Petty, 1996; Riketta, 2000; Thompson, Zanna, & Griffin, 1995) . Yet these assumptions remain unchecked in studies relying on univariate ambivalence measures. It is thus possible that the frequently reported moderator effects are not due to ambivalence as theoretically conceived and, more generally, that we know much less about the empirical effects of ambivalence than we think.
The crucial problem of the confounding of a composite variable is of a more general nature and has long been recognized in the area of discrepancy or change scores (Campbell & Kenny, 1999; J. Cohen & Cohen, 1983; Cronbach, 1955; Edwards, 1994; Johns, 1981; Stelzl, 1982; Ullrich, in press ). However, ambivalence scores are not change scores, and the consequences of this confounding may be less obvious. Furthermore, the literature on change scores has not considered the case of moderator effects, which are of central interest in ambivalence studies guided by the attitude strength perspective.
Attitudes are said to be strong to the extent that they persist over time, resist pressures to change, and have an impact on judgment and behavior Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) . A substantial literature has evolved examining several attitude attributes that would allow inferences regarding attitude strength (for reviews, see Raden, 1985; Scott, 1968; Visser, Bizer, & Krosnick, 2006) . For instance, such inferences may be based on asking people how certain they are regarding their attitude (Abelson, 1988; Gross, Holtz, & Miller, 1995; Petty, Briñol, & DeMarree, 2007) or observing how quickly they respond to the attitude probe (Fazio, 1995) . Attitude ambivalence is one of the proposed attributes whose relation to the strength concept is relatively obvious. By definition (see below), ambivalent attitudes are characterized by equally strong positive and negative evaluative tendencies and thus a lack of directional guidance. Hence, when people holding ambivalent attitudes introspect about their attitudes or prepare for action, they have to resort to situational cues to decide which of the evaluative tendencies to give more weight (Katz, 1981) . This will diminish the impact of their preexisting attitude. Empirical investigations of ambivalence therefore often estimate the following moderated multiple regression model to test the postulated moderating influence of ambivalence on attitude effects:
where Ŷ is the predicted dependent variable (e.g., attitudinally relevant behavior), X is the independent variable (i.e., attitude), A is the ambivalence index calculated according to a given ambivalence model, and XA is the product term whose coefficient b 3 represents the interactive effect of X and A on Y.
Overview of the Present Research
The main purpose of this article is to demonstrate the interpretational ambiguity associated with estimates of the moderator effect of ambivalence (b 3 in the above equation) and to propose a viable alternative approach that explicitly models positivity and negativity as the components of ambivalence. We tie these demonstrations in with two popular models of ambivalence, the conflicting reactions model (CRM; Kaplan, 1972) and the similarityintensity model (SIM; Thompson et al., 1995) .
For didactic reasons and because our critique of the current data-analytic approach is not confined to the analysis of moderator effects, we first discuss the simplest type of statistical relationships-bivariate correlations-by way of introducing the assumptions of the ambivalence models. We conclude that correlations involving index variables of ambivalence are difficult to interpret and obscure differences between ambivalence models. Then, we introduce the multivariate approach to ambivalence models (MAAM) that is designed to solve the problems identified in the univariate approach to ambivalence models (UAAM) that has been taken in previous research.
In the second part of the article, we focus on moderator effects of ambivalence. We conclude that the UAAM is faced with the same set of concerns as before, plus a particularly troublesome one: The frequently reported moderator effect of ambivalence may be a statistical artifact resulting from unmodeled correlations of positivity and negativity with the dependent variable. These problems can only be avoided by explicitly modeling the components of ambivalence as suggested by the MAAM, which requires estimating a large number of parameters. Therefore, we discuss issues of effect size and statistical power at some length before we apply the MAAM in reanalyses of published moderator effects.
In the following, we assume (a) that separate measures of positivity and negativity (P, N ) toward an attitude object form the basis for statistical calculations and (b) that these measures are scored in the same direction, such that higher scores of P reflect more positivity and higher scores of N reflect more negativity.
Ambivalence Models and Statistical Analyses
Numerous ways have been proposed to model ambivalence as a function of positive and negative object evaluations. For instance, in their influential article, Priester and Petty (1996) reviewed eight such models. Because of space limitations, only Kaplan's (1972) CRM and the SIM (Thompson et al., 1995) are considered here in detail. We opted for the CRM because it is the simplest ambivalence model and for the SIM because it is the most widely employed one . However, our demonstrations should by and large be easy to apply to other ambivalence models.
He called the sum of positivity and negativity a person feels toward an attitude object total affect and the absolute difference between these measures polarization. Equation 1 suggests that ambivalence increases as total affect (P ϩ N ) increases and decreases as polarization (|P Ϫ N |) increases. As pointed out by Priester and Petty (1996) , who also coined the term CRM, this formula essentially suggests that ambivalence (A) is a positive linear function of the measure (P, N ) exhibiting the smaller value, that is, the conflicting reaction. Thus,
To illustrate the CRM formula, let us assume that P and N can only take on either a low (e.g., 0) or a high (e.g., 1) value, yielding a 2 ϫ 2 table of possible combinations. In this scenario, we would find an A score of 2 when P and N are both high and an A score of 0 in all other cases. Thus, the CRM attributes the highest degree of ambivalence to people with strong positive and strong negative feelings toward the attitude object-which is an assumption shared by all ambivalence models-but does not distinguish between all other cells of the simplifying 2 ϫ 2 table. Although the latter assumption is directly challenged by the SIM (discussed below), let us assume for the moment that the theoretical assumptions of the CRM are perfectly reasonable.
Testing the CRM: Problems With the Univariate Approach
A straightforward way to test the assumptions of the CRM would be to examine how well it predicts theoretically related variables, for example, attitude accessibility (Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, 1992) . As discussed above, the attitude strength perspective would suggest that ambivalence decreases attitude accessibility.
For ease of exposition, we begin by describing the expected pattern of results by reference to the simplifying 2 ϫ 2 table. If we have an experimental design with P and N as orthogonal factors and attitude accessibility as the dependent variable, the assumptions of the CRM could be tested by comparing the high/high cell mean against the other three cell means. The expected pattern would reveal that accessibility would be lower in the high/high condition than in the remaining conditions but that accessibility would not differ across the remaining conditions. It is well known that a hypothesized pattern such as this cannot be tested with a single-degree-of-freedom test (e.g., Abelson, 1996) . For instance, although a contrast coded [3, Ϫ1, Ϫ1, Ϫ1] may suggest itself in the case of the CRM, the associated null hypothesis may be trivially rejected because of a main effect of P or N or both. This is because the above contrast would not be orthogonal to a contrast for a main effect, for example, [1, Ϫ1, 1, Ϫ1].
As this example shows, it is useful to distinguish between conceptual and statistical hypotheses. In the example, there is a single conceptual hypothesis: Ambivalence will be negatively related to accessibility. At the statistical level, however, this hypothesis translates into several separate tests. The CRM would be fully supported only if the high/high cell was found to be different from the remaining cells and the remaining cells in turn were judged to be equivalent in terms of accessibility (see also Bobko, 1986) .
Although ambivalence research operates differently from this simplified example in that it typically relies on continuous measures of P and N, current data-analytic practice essentially runs the same risk of misspecifying a conceptual hypothesis at the level of statistics. The problem arises when a single variable is constructed on the basis of an equation such as Equation 1 and then used to predict another variable. This more realistic scenario is considered next.
To examine the conceptual hypothesis that ambivalence is related to some dependent variable (e.g., accessibility), researchers commonly estimate Pearson correlations (e.g., Bargh et al., 1992; Bassili, 1996; Lavine, Borgida, & Sullivan, 2000; Maio, Fincham, & Lycett, 2000; van Harreveld, van der Pligt, de Vries, Wenneker, & Verhue, 2004) :
where 
where, following Edwards (1994) , W is a dummy variable that is set to 0 when P Ͼ N, set to 1 when P Ͻ N, and randomly set to 1 or 0 when P ϭ N. This preserves the qualities of the absolute difference (i.e., polarization) expression in Kaplan's (1972) ambivalence formula, for it guarantees that the smaller value of P and N will always be subtracted from the larger value. Expanding Equation 4 and simplifying yields
Because the covariance of a sum is given by the sum of the covariances, the covariance between the dependent variable (Y) and ambivalence (A) can be written as follows: 
Since this condition can be satisfied in multiple ways, the correlation coefficient Y, A is difficult to interpret. For instance, the finding of a negative relationship between an index of ambivalence and attitude accessibility (e.g., Bargh et al., 1992; van Harreveld et al., 2004 ) might simply reflect a negative relationship between accessibility and negativity, indicating slower responses to attitude objects with negative valence. Note that this and other possible alternative explanations would be inconsistent with the conceptual hypothesis, which implies that accessibility should decrease as a function of increases in positivity or negativity, depending on which of the two variables exhibits the smaller value. In sum, the current dataanalytic approach does not seem to test the intended conceptual hypothesis, which jeopardizes the validity of the conclusions that researchers draw from their research. Thompson et al. (1995) argued that Kaplan's (1972) formula does not match his theoretical characterization of ambivalence in terms of (high) total affect (P ϩ N) and (low) polarization (|P Ϫ N|). As we have seen, according to the CRM formula, ambivalence increases as a linear function of the smaller value of P and N. If a low degree of polarization of attitude components is an independent aspect of ambivalence, however, then the measure with the higher value of P and N should also affect (i.e., decrease) the amount of ambivalence. Thus, Thompson and colleagues' SIM formula slightly modifies the CRM formula as follows:
Assumptions of the SIM
The assumed impact of the higher value of P and N becomes apparent if we rewrite Equation 8 according to Priester and Petty (1996) :
To illustrate the SIM formula, consider again the simplifying 2 ϫ 2 table defined by high (e.g., 1) and low (e.g., 0) values of P and N. Like the CRM, the SIM postulates that the high/high cell would exhibit the highest level of ambivalence. However, the SIM does not assign equal status to the remaining cells. In contrast to the CRM, the low/low cell would reveal intermediate levels of ambivalence because it is as equally unpolarized as the high/high cell. Thus, the SIM treats what Kaplan (1972) called indifference as a milder form of ambivalence, sharing the similarity of P and N but lacking the overall intensity of affect.
Testing the SIM: Problems With the Univariate Approach
Previous research on the SIM has used the same correlational strategy as research on the CRM, where P and N are collapsed into a single ambivalence variable that is then used to predict a dependent variable. Thus, to reveal possible confounds underlying this strategy, we repeat the steps from Equations 4 -6 for the SIM. The following equation reproduces the nonlinear SIM formula on the left-hand side and a mathematically equivalent expression on the right-hand side:
where W again is a dummy variable that is set to 0 when P Ͼ N, set to 1 when P Ͻ N, and randomly set to 1 or 0 when P ϭ N.
Multiplying out the right-hand side of Equation 10 and simplifying yields
Under which circumstances will Y,A be nonzero when ambivalence is calculated according to the SIM, that is, Equation 11? As the following equation for the covariance between Y and A reveals,
Y, A depends on the same terms as in an analysis based on the CRM. Moreover, making the same distributional assumptions as above, we find that the covariance between Y and A will be nonzero (and therefore, Y, A 0) under exactly the same circumstances as above, namely, whenever the sum of the covariances of Y with P and N, respectively, is nonzero:
Overcoming Problems With the Univariate Approach: The Multivariate Approach to Ambivalence Models
The crucial problem revealed above is that the current dataanalytic approach treats ambivalence as a single variable, which renders statistical results ambiguous with regard to the validity of the conceptual hypothesis. As a result, it is difficult to tell if the CRM or the SIM can fit empirical data, or-equally important-if one of the models can fit the data better than the other (cf. Roberts & Pashler, 2000) .
In the following, we propose a new data-analytic procedure to overcome these difficulties. Our approach is based on a simple rule: Analyze separately what you measure separately. Thus, in contrast to what may be called the univariate approach to ambivalence models (UAAM), which prevails in the ambivalence literature, we propose the multivariate approach to ambivalence models (MAAM), which allows for unambiguous and competitive tests of and between ambivalence models.
Analyzing the CRM With the MAAM
To make the statistical hypotheses and constraints underlying the CRM transparent and testable, we begin with a simple linear regression,
where Y refers to the measured dependent variable, A refers to ambivalence calculated according to one of several ambivalence formulae, b 0 is the regression intercept, b 1 is the regression slope, and ε represents the random error term. By substituting Equation 5 for A into Equation 14 and expanding (cf. Edwards, 1994) , we obtain
The implications of Equation 15 are more readily understood by comparing it against a general moderated multiple regression model with the same variables, complemented by the missing lower order terms W and P that feature in the two-way interactions (see J. Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003) and the interaction between P and N (see Yzerbyt, Muller, & Judd, 2004) : Table 1 . The opposite pattern would be required if the conceptual hypothesis states a negative effect of ambivalence.
However, even if empirical observations were in line with the hypotheses and constraints of the CRM, we would merely know that the model can fit the data. To provide strong support for a theoretical model, it is essential to show that the data cannot be fitted as well by at least one other plausible model (cf. Roberts & Pashler, 2000) . Judging by how often it has been applied, the SIM appears to be the more plausible alternative model. In the next section, we unravel the implications of the MAAM for analyzing the SIM.
Analyzing the SIM With the MAAM
The statistical hypotheses and constraints of the SIM can be derived in the same way as for the CRM, that is, by substituting Equation 11 for A into Equation 14 and expanding, which yields
By comparing Equation 17 with the general moderated multiple regression model (Equation 16 ) restated here,
we find that the model assumptions of the SIM translate into the following statistical hypotheses. First, the effect of P should be a third of the size of the effect of N but opposite in sign
. Second, the effects of WP and WN should be four thirds the size of N but with different signs (b 5 Ϫ 4b 2 3 ϭ 0, and b 6 ϩ 4b 2 3 ϭ 0). Third, the effects of W and the interaction of P and N are assumed to be zero (b 3 ϭ b 4 ϭ 0). Table 1 presents an overview of the regression coefficients expected on the basis of the CRM and the SIM, assuming a positive effect of ambivalence on a dependent variable. This juxtaposition confirms our earlier conclusion that the CRM and the SIM make quite different predictions regarding the effects of P and N. In contrast to the univariate approach dominating the ambivalence literature, the MAAM we are proposing makes these predictions transparent and allows for competitive testing between the models. An efficient strategy to test these statistical hypotheses simultaneously is discussed in the section Estimation and Statistical Power in the MAAM. 
Note. CRM ϭ conflicting reactions model (Kaplan, 1972) ; SIM ϭ similarity-intensity model (Thompson, Zanna, & Griffin, 1995) . P and N refer to commensurate measures of positivity and negativity toward the attitude object; W is a dummy variable that equals 0 when P Ͼ N, that equals 1 when P Ͻ N, and that is randomly set to 1 or 0 when P ϭ N. PN, WP, and WN refer to product terms representing interactions among the aforementioned variables.
Moderator Effects of Ambivalence
The most frequently investigated (and generally corroborated) hypothesis about ambivalence is that it will attenuate attitude effects (e.g., Armitage & Conner, 2000; Bassili, 1996; Bell & Esses, 1997 Cavazza & Butera, 2008; Conner, Povey, Sparks, James, & Shepherd, 2003; Conner, Sherlock, & Orbell, 1998; Costarelli & Colloca, 2007; Dormandy, Hankins, & Marteau, 2006; Lavine, 2001; Maio, Bell, & Esses, 1996; Moore, 1973 Moore, , 1980 Povey, Wellens, & Conner, 2001; Riketta & Ziegler, 2007; Sparks, Conner, James, Shepherd, & Povey, 2001; Sparks, Harris, & Lockwood, 2004; Zemborain & Johar, 2007) . In other words, the impact of attitudes on subsequently reported attitudes (i.e., attitude stability) or on cognition or behavior should decrease with increasing ambivalence (for reviews in the context of the theory of planned behavior, see Armitage & Conner, 2004; Cooke & Sheeran, 2004) . In this section, we reveal problems with the current approach to testing this hypothesis.
Problems With the Univariate Approach
The modal data-analytic strategy to test this moderator hypothesis is to estimate the interaction effect of attitude and an index of ambivalence on some dependent variable, using the following general moderated multiple regression equation (note that our arguments below would similarly apply to analyses of variance after dichotomization of ambivalence, sometimes used in older studies, and multisample structural equation models sometimes used in more recent studies):
where Y is the dependent variable, X is the independent variable (i.e., in our example, attitude), A is ambivalence calculated according to a given ambivalence model, and XA is the product term whose coefficient b 3 represents the interactive effect of X and A on Y. A negative b 3 is typically interpreted as support for the hypothesis that ambivalence attenuates attitude effects. However, on the basis of the threats to validity discussed above, we suspect that this coefficient will be negative under a much more general set of conditions than is implied by the conceptual hypothesis of a moderator effect. Thus, we deem it essential to understand the conditions under which estimates of b 3 will be negative. Indeed, as we demonstrate in Online Appendix B in the supplemental materials, the expected value of b 3 is negative under a relatively broad set of conditions, and a negative b 3 is likely to occur even if no interaction effect exists in the population. Furthermore, the answer to this question does not depend on whether the CRM or the SIM is used to calculate A. This means that the univariate approach can produce results that do not allow for clear conclusions about the validity of the conceptual hypothesis that ambivalence would moderate attitude effects.
The formal proofs for this assertion (provided in Online Appendixes A and B in the supplemental materials) can be summarized in conceptual terms as follows. First, we use a general formula for the interaction effect b 3 and express all terms involving A as linear combinations of the underlying variables P and N and the dummy variable W (see above).
Second, we assume multivariate normality for the measured variables Y, X, P, and N. Although all interaction effects of centered variables are zero under multivariate normality (Aiken & West, 1991) , a linear expression of the ambivalence models necessitates the use of a dummy variable W, for which normality cannot be assumed. To determine the sign of b 3 in the population model, we must make further assumptions. The simplest assumption to make in this context is that the covariances of P and X or Y are positive and the covariances of N and X or Y are negative but of the same absolute magnitude as those of P ( Y, P ϭ Ϫ Y, N , and X, P ϭ Ϫ X, N ). Furthermore, we assume that P and N are uncorrelated.
Given these assumptions, the sign of b 3 must be negative This result is simple-but it depends on a number of assumptions we have made in the course of its derivation that are worth restating here. First, Y, X, P, and N are multivariate normal with zero means and unit variances. Second, P and N are uncorrelated, which is a widespread theoretical assumption (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994; Kaplan, 1972; Scott, 1969) and confirmed by our own data. Third, the covariances of P and X or Y are positive, and the covariances of N and X or Y are negative but of the same absolute magnitude as those of P. The symmetry of the effects of P and N on attitude is not an assumption we have made lightly. Most notably, the model of evaluative space by Cacioppo and colleagues (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994; Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1997) suggests a steeper activation function for negativity versus positivity. However, Cacioppo and colleagues also noted that the symmetry assumption is made by all ambivalence models (Cacioppo et al., 1997), so we considered it appropriate to use in deriving the implications of two of these models. The symmetry assumption is also supported by the average correlations across six different samples reported in Kaplan (1972, p. 370) as well as our own data.
In sum, our decomposition of b 3 reveals three serious problems with the current univariate approach to testing a moderator hypothesis about ambivalence. First, a negative b 3 is difficult to interpret because its conditions can be satisfied in multiple ways. Second, it follows that the univariate approach is unable to adjudicate between the competing predictions of the CRM and the SIM. Third, since a sufficient condition for a negative b 3 does not include any product terms, researchers may easily interpret a moderator artifact as support for their theory. We discuss this artifact in greater depth below.
Using the MAAM to Test a Moderator Hypothesis About Ambivalence
A multivariate treatment of ambivalence is necessary to circumvent the three problems revealed above. Therefore, we again use the rule Analyze separately what you measure separately and derive the multivariate hypotheses and constraints implied by the CRM and the SIM. Substituting the CRM formula (Equation 5) into the general moderated multiple regression model as stated in Equation 18 , we obtain
Analogously substituting the SIM formula (Equation 11) into Equation 18, we obtain
The implied constraints follow from comparisons of Equations 19 and 20 with a general moderated multiple regression equation, complemented by the lower order terms and all interactions (J. Cohen et al., 2003; Yzerbyt et al., 2004) absent from Equations 19 and 20: Table 2 provides an overview of the expected regression coefficients given the CRM and the SIM. To understand the constraints implied by the ambivalence models, it is helpful to recall that W is a dummy variable that is set to 0 when P Ͼ N and set to 1 when P Ͻ N. Thus, the moderating effects of the ambivalence component with the smaller value are carried by the variable XN when negativity is less than positivity and by the variables XP and XWP when positivity is less than negativity. Likewise, the moderating effects of the ambivalence component with the larger value are carried by the variable XP when positivity is greater than negativity and by the variables XN and XWN when negativity is greater than positivity. Because the CRM predicts no influence of the ambivalence component with the larger value, it constrains XP to zero and XWN to the same absolute value as XN, but with the opposite sign, so that the sum of XN and XWN is zero. In contrast, the SIM predicts an influence of the ambivalence component with the larger value, namely, in the opposite direction of the influence of the other ambivalence component. This becomes manifest in the opposite sign predicted for XP (relative to XN) and the nonzero sums of XN and XWN.
Equation 21 is the multiple regression model that we suggest researchers should estimate to test for moderator effects of ambivalence. It may seem odd that a single conceptual hypothesis (i.e., moderator effect) requires such a large number of statistical parameters to be estimated. However, this is not very different from testing interaction effects in experimental designs with more than two levels of a factor. As is well known, in such situations, the interaction effect is defined as the total effect of multiple binary variables coding the experimental conditions (J. Cohen et al., 2003) .
By estimating the model shown in Equation 21, researchers can determine exactly how positivity and negativity affect the relationship between X and Y and if the observed moderation is consistent with a given ambivalence model such as CRM or SIM. Most importantly, the model shown in Equation 21 allows researchers to rule out spurious moderator effects as revealed above. Furthermore, unlike the UAAM, this approach allows for direct comparisons of the assumptions of the CRM and the SIM. The section Estimation and Statistical Power in the MAAM further below is devoted to practical issues that arise when applying the MAAM to empirical data.
Reproducing the Moderator Artifact: A Monte Carlo Simulation
We have shown that the validity of conclusions based on the UAAM is seriously undermined by the confounding of the ambivalence indices with their components. Considered together, our analytical results may seem to cast a shadow of doubt on previously accepted findings in the ambivalence literature. For instance, it may appear doubtful that ambivalence moderates attitude effects, as reported in the literature cited above. We considered it important to gauge the likelihood that previous studies erroneously interpreted a 
Note. CRM ϭ conflicting reactions model (Kaplan, 1972) ; SIM ϭ similarity-intensity model (Thompson, Zanna, & Griffin, 1995) . P and N refer to commensurate measures of positivity and negativity toward the attitude object; W is a dummy variable that equals 0 when P Ͼ N, that equals 1 when P Ͻ N, and that is randomly set to 1 or 0 when P ϭ N.
moderator artifact as support for the theory. Therefore, we conducted Monte Carlo simulations 2 of the moderator effect as it would be analyzed by the UAAM and the MAAM. These simulations allow us to quantify the likelihood of false-positive reports.
Method
We drew k ϭ 100,000 samples with sample size n ϭ 150 from a population in which X was correlated with P at ϭ .4 and with N at ϭϪ.4. The variances of all variables were set equal to one, and all means were set equal to zero. On the basis of our own data as well as typical reports in the literature (e.g., see Cacioppo et al., 1997; Jonas et al., 2000) , P and N were assumed to be independent. Note that k was selected with respect to accuracy of the results and that n was selected with respect to the typical sample size in the literature. For simplicity, we assumed all variables to be continuous and measured without error, which cannot be assumed in practice. Therefore, we chose somewhat lower values of the population covariances than might be expected on a theoretical basis when X represents attitude and P and N refer to the positive and negative attitude bases, respectively.
For each sample, the dependent variable Y was first calculated as a linear combination of X, P, and N (Y ϭ X ϩ P Ϫ N), which results in a variance of Y equal to 4.6. Then, we added random errors with a mean of zero and a variance 9 times the size of the variance of Y (i.e., 41.4), so that a total of 10% of the variance of Y would on average be explained by X, P, and N. This value was chosen to reflect the fact that most studies reporting moderator effects of ambivalence have looked at dependent variables that are typically only moderately correlated with attitude (e.g., a corresponding behavior).
After each sample was drawn, we estimated the regression models suggested by the UAAM, that is, Equation 18, using the ambivalence indices based on the CRM and the SIM, and the MAAM, that is, Equation 21. We stored the vectors containing the regression estimates and calculated the lower and upper bounds of the 95% confidence interval around each estimate. Table 3 provides the results for the UAAM, including the average regression coefficients as well as the percentage of Type I errors. Because Y was modeled as an additive function of X, P, and N (Y ϭ X ϩ P Ϫ N ϩ ε), the true moderator effect b 3 is equal to zero, and all rejections of this null hypothesis constitute Type I errors. As we were only interested in negative moderator effects as typically assumed in the attitude strength literature, we counted Type I errors by observing the number of times that the upper bound of the 95% confidence interval for a parameter was lower than zero. In a correctly specified model, the percentage of Type I errors should then be around 2.5%. As can be seen in Table 3 , the UAAM produces a strikingly inflated Type I error rate, with 9.4% false rejections when the CRM index is used and 14.6% false rejections when the SIM index is used. Thus, the Monte Carlo simulations confirm our suspicion that the moderator artifact described above can occur quite frequently, namely, up to 6 times more frequently than would be expected on the basis of an alpha level of .05.
Results and Discussion
In contrast, inspection of Table 4 indicates that the MAAM recovered the true effects. Note that the averages of all regression coefficients other than those of X, P, and N are zero, with reasonable Type I error rates, which is what one would expect when a model is correctly specified. The clear advantage of the MAAM is that it models all individual and interactive effects of the components of ambivalence so that artifactual results like the ones observed with the UAAM can be ruled out. However, considering the increased number of estimated parameters, we need to examine the issue of statistical power more closely before the MAAM can be put into practice. In the next section, we first discuss the steps involved in estimating the multivariate moderator model and then derive the necessary sample sizes that would allow researchers to operate with adequate power.
Estimation and Statistical Power in the MAAM
We have proposed an approach to testing ambivalence hypotheses (MAAM) that allows researchers to deconfound the independent effects of the variables underlying the ambivalence construct, that is, positivity and negativity. With regard to ambivalence as the conceptual independent or moderator variable, we have derived the multivariate models implied by the CRM and the SIM. It is important to note that the MAAM is not confined to these specific models (as shown in Tables 1 and 2) . Rather, the MAAM should be understood as a general and flexible alternative to the ambiguous index variables that allows the separate effects of positivity and negativity to be ascertained. As such, the MAAM enables researchers to hypothesize and discover entirely new effects of positivity and negativity. Nevertheless, the CRM and the SIM constitute very plausible working models of ambivalence that appear to be ready for formal model tests (as opposed to exploratory analyses). In the following, we therefore clarify how the model assumptions of the CRM and the SIM can be tested in practice. Tables 1 and 2 reveal that the statistical hypotheses implied by ambivalence models are of two kinds. One group of hypotheses postulates a parameter to be different from zero (labeled Hypotheses), and the other group of hypotheses postulates a parameter to be equal to zero or another quantity (labeled Constraints). Thus, supporting evidence for a given ambivalence model would consist of a subset of parameters being significant and another subset of parameters being nonsignificant. In fact, to test a conceptual hypothesis about ambivalence, only one parameter is estimated freely (i.e., b 2 in Table 1 and b 6 in Table 2 ). All other parameters relevant to the conceptual hypothesis are constrained to zero or to multiples or fractions of the free parameter. This means that, fortunately, the apparent multitude of hypotheses can be reduced to two statistical tests that need to be performed to obtain support for a given ambivalence model: First, the null hypothesis that b 2 (cf. Table 1) or b 6 (cf. Table 2), respectively, is zero needs to be rejected. Second, the null hypothesis associated with the entire set of constraints needs to be retained. For instance, the constraints implied by the CRM (cf. Table 2) translate into the following null hypothesis:
To carry out a power analysis for the first statistical test, we need to derive a realistic estimate of the moderator effect size. Because of space limitations, we ignore the less complex case of ambivalence as independent variable and focus on ambivalence as a moderator variable in the context of attitude strength research. Note that it is impossible to use moderator effect sizes obtained by studies using the UAAM because the above analyses have shown that these effect sizes confound the individual effects of positivity and negativity and the effect of ambivalence as theoretically defined. In the absence of empirical information from prior research, power analysts usually rely on conventions regarding what constitutes a small, medium, or large effect size (J. Cohen, 1962 Cohen, , 1988 . However, it has been noted that these conventions are too optimistic in the context of multiple regression analysis, especially with regard to moderator effects (Maxwell, 2000; Whisman & McClelland, 2005) . For instance, applying Cohen's conventions to increments in explained variance due to a moderator variable, we would define 2%, 18%, and 54% of incremental variance explained as small, medium, and large effects, respectively. However, metaanalytic reviews of moderator effects in field studies found median values of 0.2% (based on 158 independent effects of categorical moderator variables; cf. Aguinis, Beaty, Boik, & Pierce, 2005) and 2% (based on 22 partly dependent effects of continuous moderator variables; cf. Champoux & Peters, 1987) . Even if we ignore the possibility of publication bias, these values suggest that Cohen's conventions should be adjusted when classifying moderator effects in observational data. Thus, in the following section, we will derive more realistic estimates of moderator effects of ambivalence in the context of the MAAM.
Deriving Estimates of the Moderator Effect Size
How large an effect can we expect for the parameter b 6 that is associated with the product term XN, assuming that there exists a moderator effect of ambivalence? This effect size is usually expressed as the increment in explained variance or, equivalently, the squared semipartial correlation between Y and the moderator term  XN, that is, Y, XN There are at least two circumstances that limit the size of the increment in explained variance Y, XN.X . . . WPN 2 . First, moderator effects of ambivalence are typically investigated in field studies, where the observed variables are correlated and/or tend to approximate normal distributions. These factors are known to decrease the residual variance and, therefore, effect size of product terms relative to experiments (McClelland & Judd, 1993) . Second, ambivalence researchers ordinarily expect only an ordinal interaction, which limits moderator effect size as well (Rogers, 2002) . For instance, it is plausible that the relationship between attitude and behavior approaches zero as ambivalence increases, but it is less plausible that it reverses at some point (i.e., a negative relationship between attitudes and behavior). Under such circumstances, "to have strong ordinal moderation, there must be a strong effect to be moderated" (Rogers, 2002, p. 223) .
Given these constraints, it is instructive to first determine the maximal effect size. Numerical definitions of smaller effects can then be proposed as reasonable fractions of maximal effect sizes. Unfortunately, it is impractical to determine the maximal value of the increment in explained variance analytically because this task would Note. UAAM ϭ univariate approach to ambivalence models; X ϭ simulated attitude variable; A ϭ ambivalence index calculated according to the conflicting reactions model (CRM) or the similarity-intensity model (SIM); XA ϭ product of X and A. Note. MAAM ϭ multivariate approach to ambivalence models; X ϭ simulated attitude variable; P ϭ simulated positivity variable; N ϭ simulated negativity variable; W ϭ dummy variable that equals 0 when P Ͼ N, that equals 1 when P Ͻ N, and that is randomly set to 1 or 0 when P ϭ N; XP to WPN ϭ products of the aforementioned variables.
presuppose that we know the population variance-covariance matrix underlying the full multivariate model as stated in Equation 21. What we do know, however, is the typical size of the effect that we expect to be moderated, for instance, the meta-analytically derived r Ϸ .4 for attitude-behavior relations (Eckes & Six, 1994; Kraus, 1995; Wallace, Paulson, Lord, & Bond, 2005) or a more speculative range of r ϭ .7 to r ϭ .9 for attitude-attitude relations (stabilities). These values are useful starting points for our power analyses because they allow us to estimate the maximal value of the increment in explained variance by simulating data as they would be gathered by field researchers. The interested reader is referred to the Appendix for further details about the simulations. The final results of the simulations are shown in Table 5 . On the basis of given the size of the effect that they expect to be moderated. For instance, a researcher examining moderation of an attitude-behavior relation would look up the increment in explained variance associated with a correlation of approximately .40, which would be 0.36% if the assumptions of the CRM were exactly true and 0.50% if the assumptions of the SIM were exactly true.
On the basis of Cohen's conventions for effect sizes, these effects would be considered small, although they are as large as they can be given the constraints discussed above. Are ambivalence researchers looking for trivially small effects? Whenever possible, J. Cohen (1962) used the criterion of noticeability and concluded, for instance, that a difference of eight IQ points between two populations (medium effect) would be noticeable whereas a difference of four IQ points (small effect) would not. It seems to us that the difference between individuals whose attitudes are strongly related to behavior and individuals whose attitudes are unrelated to behavior (i.e., the typical moderator effect of ambivalence) would indeed be noticeable and that the practical significance of being able to detect this difference would be large. Furthermore, given the importance of the attitude construct in many applied settings, researchers are likely to be interested in detecting effects below the maximal effect size.
Power of the MAAM as a Function of the X, Y Correlation and Various Sample Sizes
Thus, we considered it useful to determine the sample sizes required for adequate statistical power not only for maximal moderator effect sizes but for smaller effect sizes as well. Fifty percent of the maximal effect size appeared to us as a reasonable benchmark that would be readily interpretable (cf. P. Cohen, Cohen, Aiken, & West, 1999) . Effect sizes much lower than the 50% benchmark can be anticipated to require unreasonably large sample sizes, and there is as yet no theoretical justification for expecting any specific values within the 50% to 100% range of possible effect sizes.
Monte Carlo simulations. On the basis of the effect size values established above, we conducted power analyses by way of Monte Carlo simulations. For each ambivalence model, various sample sizes, and correlations between X and Y, we determined the power of the MAAM for rejecting the null hypothesis that b 6 Ն 0 with a Type I error (alpha) level of 5%, which is the first step in detecting the attenuating moderator effect of ambivalence. We used sample sizes from n ϭ 300 to n ϭ 3,000, with increments of 300, plus the sample size of n ϭ 150 that researchers using the UAAM might consider satisfactory. As previously discussed, the size of the moderator effect is limited by the size of the effect that is assumed to be moderated by ambivalence, that is, the zero-order correlation between X (e.g., attitude) and Y (e.g., a corresponding behavior or attitude assessed at a later point in time). At the same time, researchers are probably more certain about the expected size of the correlation between X and Y than the actual increment in explained variance due to the interaction term XN ͑ Y, XN.X . . . WPN 2 ). Therefore, we included in our simulations a range of zero-order correlations between X and Y from .30 to .90, with increments of .10, that would be useful to researchers planning a study including a moderator effect of ambivalence. In summary, our simulations had a 2 (underlying true model: CRM vs. SIM) ϫ 2 (moderator effect size: maximal vs. 50%) ϫ 7 (size of zero-order correlation between X and Y) ϫ 11 (sample size) design with 1,000 replications per condition.
It is important to bear in mind that the results of these simulations are contingent on our specifications regarding the distributions of the variables X, P, and N. As in all previously reported analyses and simulations, we assumed multivariate normality, symmetric correlations of X with P and N (r ϭ .40, and r ϭ Ϫ.40), and a zero correlation between P and N. Although we do believe these assumptions are realistic, it would be unreasonable to assume that they hold exactly in any given population. Therefore, rather than putting too much weight on the exact numerical results, we invite readers to use the results of our simulations only to get a rough idea of the extent of statistical power under various circumstances.
The power estimates are graphed in Figures 1, 2, 3 , and 4. A maximal moderator effect size was assumed for the simulation results shown in Figure 1 here by a solid horizontal line at the conventional value of .80) is reached only at sample sizes of approximately n ϭ 3,000, provided that the population moderator effect is indeed maximal and no measurement error reduces the observed sample effect. In contrast, Figure 3 (with the CRM as the underlying true ambivalence model) and Figure 4 (with the SIM as the underlying true ambivalence model) depict the power estimates assuming a moderator effect size of only 50% of the maximal effect size. Given a raw correlation between X and Y of .30, power is estimated to be inadequate across the full range of sample sizes considered in our simulations. For instance, if the underlying true model is the CRM, power would be only approximately 50% even if the sample comprised as many as n ϭ 3,000 observations. Given a zero-order correlation of .40 (i.e., the average correlation reported in several meta-analyses of the attitude-behavior relation), power is estimated to be just adequate at a sample size of n ϭ 3,000. This is a rather discouraging message for researchers interested in testing moderator effects of ambivalence on relationships that are only moderately strong, such as the attitude-behavior relationship. We return to this point in the General Discussion.
Nevertheless, Figures 1-4 also demonstrate that adequate levels of power can be reached with reasonably large samples as the zero-order correlation between X and Y increases. For instance, values of the correlation between .70 and .90 elevate power beyond the .80 convention at sample sizes of n ϭ 1,000 and less, which are standard sample sizes in survey research. Such values are often observed with regard to the temporal stability of attitudes, which, according to the attitude strength perspective , should be moderated by ambivalence. Indeed, studies using the UAAM have found ambivalence to decrease the temporal stability of attitudes in such diverse domains as dieting (Armitage & Conner, 2000) and voting behavior (Lavine, 2001 ). Thus, attitude stability appears to be an ideal area of research for us to compare the UAAM and MAAM using empirical data.
Ambivalence as Moderator of Attitude Stability:
Reanalyses of Lavine (2001) In the preceding sections, we have shown (a) that a multivariate approach (MAAM) is required for researchers to be able to confidently interpret their results as due to ambivalence rather than possible statistical artifacts and (b) that the chances for detecting a moderator effect of ambivalence are maximal when the moderated effect is large. To demonstrate the applicability of the MAAM, we have therefore chosen a published study of the temporal stability of political attitudes that is generally stronger than any other attitude effect hypothesized to be moderated by ambivalence. Another desirable feature of the study by Lavine (2001) is that it used data from the American National Election Studies, which are based on large sample sizes and are freely available over the Internet. Of central interest is Lavine's (2001, p. 917) first hypothesis: "Ambivalence will be associated with instability in summary candidate evaluations over the course of an election campaign, as considerations of different valence may prevail in the construction of candidate attitudes at different times." This hypothesis was tested with respect to the 10 candidates running for president in the elections from 1980 to 1996. The author used the UAAM (i.e., created an index variable based on the SIM) and found good support for the hypothesis: Predicting postelection candidate evaluations, the author obtained negative interaction effects between preelection candidate evaluations and ambivalence in all cases, and seven of the ten interactions were statistically significant (see Lavine, 2001, Table 4, p. 923) .
In our terms, pre-and postelection candidate evaluations are measures of attitude at Time 1 (X) and Time 2 (Y), respectively, and were obtained with feeling thermometer scales (from 0 to 100). Positivity (P) and negativity (N) scores were obtained as the number of likes/dislikes (from 0 to 5) mentioned in response to the question whether "there is anything in particular about [candidate] that might make you want to vote [FOR or AGAINST] him?", followed by up to four additional probes ("Anything else?"). Although Lavine (2001) used several control variables, we restricted our reanalyses to these four variables because our goal was simply to compare the conclusions about the moderator effect of ambivalence that would follow from the UAAM versus the MAAM. We retrieved the data sets used by Lavine (2001) from the internet (http://www.electionstudies.org/) and saved only the relevant variables (X, Y, P, and N) in a new data set using listwise deletion of cases with missing values.
Replicating Lavine's (2001) Results With the UAAM
Although data preparation as described above resulted in slightly discrepant sample sizes compared with those reported by Lavine (2001) , we were able to fully replicate his results regarding the moderating effect of ambivalence. Using the UAAM, we obtained negative interactions between attitude at Time 1 and ambivalence (calculated according to the SIM) for all 10 candidates, which were statistically significant in 9 out of 10 cases (the exception was the 1988 attitude toward George Bush). Note that the greater number of significant interactions in our analyses is likely due to the missing control variables, which need not concern us further because the overall conclusion remains the same: The UAAM produces good support for the hypothesis that ambivalence would moderate the temporal stability of attitudes toward presidential candidates. 
Analyses With the MAAM
Next, we applied the MAAM by estimating the multiple regression model shown in Equation 23 separately for all 10 presidential candidates:
Preliminary analyses of the zero-order correlations of X and Y generally confirmed our expectations of values above .70 and reassured us that statistical power was above .80 given the large sample sizes (ns between 1,286 and 2,154). The first step in interpreting the results of the MAAM is to evaluate the coefficient b 6 (indicating the moderating influence of N when N Ͻ P), which should be negative according to the CRM as well as the SIM (cf. Table 2 ). Given reasonable support for this hypothesis, the second step consists of constraining relevant parameters based on the different ambivalence models (cf. Table 2 ) and observing which of the ambivalence models (if any) is more consistent with the data. However, estimates of b 6 were positive in 6 out of 10 cases, violating the assumptions of both ambivalence models. All t values were below the critical values for the one-sided tests of the four negative estimates (|t|s between .24 and 1.61, t crit ϭ 1.65) and the two-sided tests of the six positive estimates (| t |s between .12 and 1.82, t crit ϭ 1.96), meaning that despite adequate statistical power, the null hypothesis b 6 ϭ 0 cannot be rejected for any of these analyses.
The largest negative value for b 6 was obtained in the analyses of the 1980 attitudes toward Ronald Reagan. Although not statistically significant, this coefficient can be used to illustrate the second step involved in interpreting the MAAM results, that is, imposing the theoretical constraints on the other parameters relevant to the conceptual hypothesis. Table 6 shows all estimates of the regression coefficients based on the analyses of the 1980 attitudes toward Ronald Reagan next to the theoretical constraints based on the CRM and the SIM. Pretending for illustrative purposes that b 6 ϭ Ϫ.16 was statistically significant, we first examined if the other coefficients were roughly consistent with the constraints.
The CRM, as well as the SIM, constrains b 7 and b 13 to zero, which appears to be consistent with the estimates b 7 ϭ Ϫ.02 and b 13 ϭ .01. Constraints diverge between the CRM and the SIM with regard to the remaining coefficients. First, according to the CRM, the coefficient b 5 (indicating the moderating influence of P when P Ͼ N) should be zero, whereas it should be Ϫ 1 3 times the value of b 6 according to the SIM. Thus, the empirical estimate b 5 ϭ .10 appears to be more consistent with the SIM than with the CRM. Second, according to the CRM, the coefficient b 11 (indicating, when added to b 5 , the moderating influence of P when P Ͻ N) should have the same value as b 6 , whereas it should be 4/3 times the value of b 6 according to the SIM. The empirical estimate b 11 ϭ .03, however, appears to be inconsistent with both the CRM's and the SIM's constraints. In other words, for people whose positivity toward Ronald Reagan was less than their negativity, increases in positivity did not seem to reduce attitude stability, as would be implied by both ambivalence models. Finally, according to the CRM, the coefficient b 12 (indicating, when added to b 6 , the moderating influence of N when N Ͼ P) should have the same absolute value as b 6 but the opposite sign, whereas it should be Ϫ 4 3 times the value of b 6 according to the SIM. As the constraints are only slightly divergent, the empirical estimate b 12 ϭ .19 could be consistent with both models. In sum, visual inspection of the regression coefficients revealed one major violation of the constraints implied by the CRM and the SIM (i.e., the nonnegative estimate for b 11 ). In fact, as could be expected on the basis of the previous discussion, a simultaneous test of all CRM constraints (carried out with the software R using the function lht; see Fox, 2002) was statistically significant, F(5, 1271) ϭ 4.67, p Ͻ .001, meaning that the empirical estimates are improbable given the constraints. Similarly, a test of all SIM constraints was statistically significant, F(5, 1271) ϭ 4.77, p Ͻ .001. Ideally, to obtain support for a given ambivalence model, b 6 would have to be significantly less than zero, and formal tests of the constraints would reveal systematic discrepancies from the data for one model but not the other.
Exploratory analyses. The results reported above clearly demonstrate that conclusions based on the UAAM and the MAAM can diverge widely. From a model-testing perspective, it must be concluded that either the assumptions of the CRM and the SIM about the nature of ambivalence are wrong or else there exists no moderating effect of ambivalence on the temporal stability of attitudes. Nevertheless, the estimates resulting from the MAAM can and should be further exploited in a more descriptive manner. After all, it is possible that the true moderator effect is smaller than 50% of the maximal effect, as assumed in our power analyses, and multicollinearity of the predictor variables might work against our finding significant results. Moreover, systematic patterns discrepant from the assumptions of the CRM and the SIM may be gleaned from these results. A convenient way to screen the results for systematic patterns is to calculate the 
To maximize the contrast between the conditional values, we suggest using the mean and two standard deviations above and below the mean to represent moderate, high, and low values for P and N, respectively. Thus, if P and N have been standardized as in our analyses, these conditional values would be 0, 2, and Ϫ2. The values required for W depend on the combination of values used for P and N. As discussed above, W should be 1 if P Ͻ N, 0 if P Ͼ N, and .50 if P ϭ N. Crossing the 3 ϫ 3 conditional values for P and N, we obtain nine simple slopes. Table 7 shows the patterns of simple slopes that would be expected if the CRM or the SIM would hold exactly (assuming a maximal moderator effect size; see above) as well as one illustrative empirical pattern derived from the reanalyses of attitudes toward the 1980 Ronald Reagan. As will be recalled, the CRM and the SIM share the assumption that ambivalence should increase when the smaller of the two ambivalence components (P, N) increases and that ambivalence should be maximal when P and N are both at their maximum. Because ambivalence is hypothesized to decrease attitude stability, we would expect the flattest slope at high values for both P and N and increasingly flatter slopes from left to right in the rows with high conditional values for N and from top to bottom in the columns with high conditional values for P. The empirical simple slopes pattern shown in Table 7 , however, corresponds only poorly with these assumptions. The flattest slope cannot be found in the high ambivalence cell, and the same is true of analyses based on the other nine presidential candidates (which are not shown for space considerations). Furthermore, when N is high, increasing P appears to increase temporal stability (as could be anticipated given that b 5 ϩ b 11 ϭ .13), and the expected decrease cannot be observed in any of the other nine analyses. Only when P is high are increasing values of N associated with decreasing slopes, which is, however, only true for two of the other nine analyses.
In summary, our reanalyses of the data used by Lavine (2001) have completely reversed the original conclusion that the data strongly support the moderator hypothesis. Although the MAAM had more than adequate power for detecting effects as small as 50% of the maximal moderator effect size, we did not obtain any significant moderator effects in 10 different analyses. Moreover, exploratory analyses revealed no systematic pattern whatsoever that would be indicative of ambivalence effects. Thus, the positive results obtained by Lavine (2001) may possibly be due to the previously discussed statistical artifacts that are inherent in the UAAM.
General Discussion
Ambivalence is a central concept in research on attitude strength (e.g., that is applied across many psychological subdisciplines. The current surge of ambivalence research owes much to a minority of scholars consistently arguing for the theoretical independence of positive and negative attitude bases (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994; Kaplan, 1972; Scott, 1969) and the proliferation of several models of how positivity and negativity combine to produce the feeling of ambivalence. Apparently, the field could not be better prepared to improve our understanding of the nature of ambivalence. However, the methodology used in previous research suffers from a set of shortcomings that undermine the validity of empirical conclusions that can be drawn from this research.
As the current article has shown, the core of the problem is that previous research has tended to combine two theoretically and empirically independent variables (i.e., positivity and negativity) into a single ambivalence index, which is then subjected to further statistical analyses. It is important to note that there are exceptions to this approach. Probably the most sophisticated and comprehensive empirical analysis of attitude ambivalence can be found in the research of Priester and Petty (1996) , who examined subjective ambivalence as a function of the positive and negative attitude bases to derive a new ambivalence formula. However, their statistical analyses were based on dominant versus conflicting reactions, that is, variables reflecting the maximum versus minimum of positivity and negativity. Like the ambivalence indices, in fact, like any variable that is constructed on the basis of theoretically distinct component variables, the dominant versus conflicting reactions confound the separate effects of their components. Mutatis mutandis, then, even this otherwise excellent work can be subsumed under what we have termed the UAAM, which dominates the literature to date. Note. MAAM ϭ multivariate approach to ambivalence models; ANES ϭ American National Election Studies; CRM ϭ conflicting reactions model (Kaplan, 1972) ; SIM ϭ similarity-intensity model (Thompson, Zanna, & Griffin, 1995) . P and N refer to commensurate measures of positivity and negativity toward the attitude object; W is a dummy variable that equals 0 when P Ͼ N, that equals 1 when P Ͻ N, and that is randomly set to 1 or 0 when P ϭ N. The critical t values for rejecting the null hypothesis with ␣ ϭ .05 are 1.96 (two-sided test) and 1.65 (one-sided test).
In the present article, we have pointed out three serious problems with the UAAM, focusing on the CRM (Kaplan, 1972) and the SIM (Thompson et al., 1995) of ambivalence. First and most generally, statistical relationships obtained by the UAAM are difficult to interpret because the ambivalence index is necessarily confounded with the separate effects of its components. We have demonstrated, for instance, that a positive relationship between an ambivalence index and a dependent variable can be obtained when the sum of the covariances of positivity and negativity with the dependent variable is larger than zero ( Y, N ϩ Y, P Ͼ 0). Thus, the effect of either positivity or negativity may be solely responsible for the statistical estimate of a positive relationship between an ambivalence index and a dependent variable, in which case the estimate (i.e., a correlation coefficient) and the label (i.e., effect of ambivalence) would not match and the conclusion would be invalid (cf. Reichardt, 2006) . In the same vein, the UAAM makes it difficult for researchers within and across laboratories to be sure if they have obtained the same results, which impedes the production of cumulative knowledge (e.g., via meta-analysis).
The second problem of the UAAM follows directly from the first: The UAAM fails to adjudicate between mutually exclusive ambivalence models. Although the CRM and the SIM differ in one important aspect, research relying on multiple ambivalence indices including the CRM and the SIM has generally reported converging results (e.g., Jost & Burgess, 2000; Petty, Tormala, Briñol, & Jarvis, 2006; Priester & Petty, 2001; Riketta, 2000; SpencerRodgers, Peng, Wang, & Hou, 2004) . However, this empirical convergence is unsatisfying because the theoretical assumptions of the CRM and the SIM differ with regard to the influence of the dominant reactions. Whereas the CRM postulates that subjective ambivalence is a positive linear function of the minimum of positivity and negativity (i.e., the conflicting reactions), the SIM postulates an additional negative effect of the maximum of positivity and negativity (i.e., the dominant reactions).
Third, the UAAM can produce a moderator effect of ambivalence where none exists. We have examined in some detail the conditions amenable to finding a negative interaction effect between attitude and an ambivalence index on some outcome variable (e.g., a related behavior or attitude measured at a later point in time) such as has often been reported in the literature (Armitage & Conner, 2004; Cooke & Sheeran, 2004) . With regard to the CRM and the SIM, we have found that a sufficient condition for a negative interaction effect to occur is implied by positive covariances of positivity with attitude and the dependent variable and negative covariances of negativity with attitude and the dependent variable. Simply put, because the UAAM does not model these covariances (although it is hard to imagine attitudes unrelated to the attitude bases), they emerge as an artifactual moderator effect. We used Monte Carlo simulations to demonstrate that Type I errors (i.e., falsely concluding that a significant moderator effect exists) are seriously inflated with respect to the interaction as modeled by the UAAM.
All of these problems can be solved by following a simple rule, namely, analyze separately what you measure separately. Building on the illuminating work of Edwards (1994) , we have proposed an alternative data-analytic approach that we have called the MAAM. The MAAM consists of translating the assumptions of a given ambivalence model into a multivariate pattern of statistical hypotheses and constraints (cf . Tables 1 and 2 ). Unfortunately, the simple rule underlying the MAAM mandates that a large number of parameters be estimated, which increases the need for large samples in the interest of statistical power.
Three major conclusions emerge from our analyses of statistical power of the MAAM in the context of moderator hypotheses. First, as is more generally true of ordinal interactions (Rogers, 2002) , the moderator effect size is limited by the size of the effect that is assumed to be moderated. Second, therefore, the sample sizes required to achieve acceptable power levels (e.g., .80 and higher) exceed n ϭ 3,000 when the effect to be moderated is as low as .30 (e.g., a correlation between attitude and behavior). We return to this point below. Third, however, the MAAM achieves acceptable power with more readily available sample sizes of n ϭ 1,000 and less when the effect to be moderated is as high as .70 (e.g., attitude stabilities). This put us in a position to compare the UAAM and the MAAM on an equal footing by reanalyzing published moderator effects of ambivalence on the temporal stability of political attitudes (Lavine, 2001) . Results obtained with the MAAM completely changed the original conclusion from strong support for the moderator hypothesis to no support whatsoever. Given our power analyses, we are confident that the null results accurately reflect a moderator effect "that wasn't there." The previously reported positive results are probably due to the statistical artifacts inherent to the UAAM.
In sum, our analytic as well as our empirical results strongly suggest that the MAAM produces more valid conclusions about the effects of ambivalence than the UAAM. Nevertheless, our research is limited by several features that future research may profitably address.
Limitations
One limitation of the present research is the limited range of ambivalence models that we considered. Although the CRM and the SIM represent the simplest and the most frequently applied ambivalence models, respectively, there are a number of competing models (for reviews, see Breckler, 1994; Jonas et al., 2000; Priester & Petty, 1996; Riketta, 2000; Thompson et al., 1995) . It would be desirable to explicate the multivariate pattern of statistical hypotheses and con- Table 6 .
straints for these models as well so that their empirical validity could be jointly tested. For instance, the ambivalence model of Katz and colleagues (1986) stipulates that ambivalence would result from a multiplicative effect of positivity and negativity. To test it against the predictions of the CRM and the SIM, one would focus on estimates of the multiplicative parameter b 4 in Equation 16, which is constrained to zero by the CRM and the SIM. However, other models imply more complicated nonlinear functions that deserve a more detailed discussion than can be provided here. In addition to the aforementioned reviews, there is also a unique ambivalence model implicit in the evaluative space model (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994; Cacioppo et al., 1997) briefly discussed above. Thus, a priority of future research should be to empirically compare the different ambivalence models more exhaustively. Moreover, we have presented all of our analyses in terms of observed variables, neglecting the issue of measurement error. Whereas (random) measurement error generally deflates effect size estimates, the influence of measurement error on parameter estimates from regression models including nonlinear terms is unpredictable (Baron & Kenny, 1986) . Although the MAAM achieves greater unbiasedness of the parameter estimates than the UAAM, there is certainly room for improving on the bias resulting from measurement error. Considering the nuanced mathematical predictions of the diverse ambivalence models, it would be especially desirable if future research would take advantage of the possibilities of latent nonlinear structural equation modeling (cf. Jöreskog & Yang, 1996; Kenny & Judd, 1984; Klein & Moosbrugger, 2000; Klein & Muthén, 2007; Marsh, Wen, & Hau, 2004; Schermelleh-Engel, Klein, & Moosbrugger, 1998) , which seems well suited for the analysis of the kinds of multivariate models called for by the MAAM (for a recent review of advantages and challenges of latent nonlinear structural equation modeling, see Dimitruk, Schermelleh-Engel, Kelava, & Moosbrugger, 2007) .
The Case for Experimental Research on Ambivalence
A serious problem revealed by our comparisons of the UAAM and the MAAM is the seemingly unavoidable trade-off between interpretational clarity and statistical power. To reiterate, given typical sample sizes in psychological research, it seems impossible to achieve adequate statistical power to detect a moderator effect of ambivalence on small to moderate attitude effects. Although the UAAM requires fewer parameters to be estimated, which would increase power, this would hardly justify using it given the interpretational problems discussed in the present article.
To avoid this dilemma, it is important to recall that moderator effects are difficult to obtain in observational research more generally (McClelland & Judd, 1993) , not only in research on ambivalence. The fact that the UAAM tends to produce artifactual moderator effects might have obscured this more general limitation. As discussed by McClelland and Judd (1993) , normality of distributions and correlations among the observed variables are among the factors that conspire to minimize the chances that researchers will detect interactions in field research. Simply increasing sample size indefinitely is not an option for ethical and practical reasons (McClelland, 1997) , although the sampling of attitude objects or times (see, e.g., Reis & Gable, 2000) rather than research participants could be explored as more economical alternatives for increasing degrees of freedom and reducing error variance in observational research. It appears most promising, however, to move ambivalence research from the field into the lab, where the effect sizes and variable distributions are under the researcher's control.
Attitude strength researchers typically rely on three general techniques for studying strength-related attitude attributes: manipulation, measurement, and known groups (Wegener, Downing, Krosnick, & Petty, 1995) . In the ambivalence literature, the latter two are vastly overrepresented compared with experimental manipulations, but noteworthy exceptions exist that demonstrate the viability of an experimental approach to ambivalence. For instance, novel attitudes could be created by orthogonally varying the extent of positivity and negativity implied by attribute lists (e.g., Jonas, Diehl, & Brömer, 1997; Priester & Petty, 1996 , Experiments 2 and 3), text paragraphs (e.g., Nordgren, van Harreveld, & van der Pligt, 2006; van Harreveld, Rutjens, Rotteveel, Nordgren, & van der Pligt, 2008) , or evaluative conditioning procedures (Petty et al., 2006, Experiment 1) . When such manipulations are intended to span more than two factor levels, efficiency (and therefore statistical power) can be optimized by assigning greater proportions of participants to the extreme factor levels (see McClelland, 1997) .
More preliminaries are necessary for researchers to be able to manipulate ambivalence toward preexisting targets such as real social groups, consumer products, health-related behaviors, and so on. This would require an experimental procedure that could be used to produce a change in positivity toward the attitude object but not in negativity (and vice versa). The literature on persuasion offers numerous paradigms that might be adapted for this purpose. For instance, researchers might adopt one of various procedures for manipulating thought confidence (see, e.g., Briñol & Petty, 2004) and apply it selectively to the positive or negative attitude bases. In fact, this is exactly what recent research has done with regard to fictitious attitude objects (Briñol, Petty, & DeMarree, 2008 ). It appears promising to extend this line of research to more meaningful social attitudes typically emphasized in ambivalence research. With high initial levels of ambivalence, as can be found in many ingroup (e.g., Jost & Burgess, 2000) or outgroup attitudes (e.g., Katz et al., 1986) , a thought confidence manipulation could separately target positivity and negativity for persuasion.
In sum, while the exact procedures are likely to depend on the attitude object under study, an experimental approach appears to be a viable solution to the trade-off between interpretational clarity and statistical power. Considering the lack of even directional support for ambivalence theory uncovered by our reanalyses of Lavine (2001) , one might wonder if more powerful designs are really necessary. It is important to note, however, that the primary purpose of our reanalyses is to illustrate the strikingly different conclusions implied by the UAAM and the MAAM. Although these reanalyses involved five independent data sets and 10 different attitude objects, we are reluctant to generalize the findings to other populations or attitude objects both because there exist no independent replications and because the data did not allow for the modeling of measurement error. Furthermore, there are many more main effect and moderator hypotheses about ambivalence that have yet to be examined (and reexamined) in the light of the insights offered in the present article. Thus, we encourage research aiming to revise our conclusions about the "moderator effect that wasn't there" by taking an experimental approach to study design and a multivariate approach to data analysis.
Equations A5 and A6 were constructed in such a way that the simple slope of the regression of Y on X would always be nonnegative and therefore allow us to determine the maximal value of the increment in explained variance Y, XN.X . . . WPN 2 given the constraints imposed by an ordinal interaction and the assumption that X, P, and N are multivariate normal when researchers collect observational data in the field.
Monte Carlo Simulations
On the basis of the generating functions (Equations A5 and A6), we conducted Monte Carlo simulations. As before, we assumed the variables X, P, and N to be multivariate normal, with zero means and unit variances. Furthermore, we assumed P and N to be independent of each other and to be correlated with X at ϭ .4 and ϭ Ϫ.4, respectively. We were interested in the maximal population effect size of the increment in explained variance Y, XN.X . . . WPN 2 as a function of the bivariate correlation between X and Y because the latter would be the only piece of information available to ambivalence researchers interested in testing a moderator effect. Although it is impractical to vary this correlation directly, it can be varied indirectly by varying the squared multiple correlation between Y and the full set of predictor variables. Thus, in an iterative process, we used the generating functions (Equations A5 and A6) and added various amounts of random error to the dependent variable (i.e., multiples of the variance of Y) that would result in .10 increments of the bivariate correlation between X and Y from .30 to .90. Because we were interested in estimates of the population values of the increment in explained variance due to the moderator term XN, we used large simulated data sets (n ϭ 100,000). For each targeted correlation, we continued with the simulations until the interquartile range of the results from 100 consecutive simulation runs included no correlation that could not be rounded to the desired value. For instance, to produce a correlation of .30 between X and Y, assuming that a maximally large moderator effect of ambivalence as conceived by the CRM exists in the data, it was necessary to add random errors with a variance equal to .901/.099 times the original variance of Y. Table 5 in the main text provides the final estimates resulting from these iterative simulations.
